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Equilibria of Chinese Auctions
Simina Braˆnzei ∗ Clara Forero † Kate Larson † Peter Bro Miltersen ∗
Abstract
Chinese auctions are a combination between a raffle and an auction and are held in practice at charity
events or festivals. In a Chinese auction, multiple players compete for several items by buying tickets,
which can be used to win the items. In front of each item there is a basket, and the players can bid by
placing tickets in the basket(s) corresponding to the item(s) they are trying to win. After all the players
have placed their tickets, a ticket is drawn at random from each basket and the item is given to the owner
of the winning ticket. While a player is never guaranteed to win an item, they can improve their chances of
getting it by increasing the number of tickets for that item. In this paper we investigate the existence of pure
Nash equilibria in both the continuous and discrete settings. When the players have continuous budgets, we
show that a pure Nash equilibrium may not exist for asymmetric games when some valuations are zero. In
that case we prove that the auctioneer can stabilize the game by placing his own ticket in each basket. On the
other hand, when all the valuations are strictly positive, a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, and
the equilibrium strategies are symmetric when both valuations and budgets are symmetric. We also study
Chinese auctions with discrete budgets, for which we give both existence results and counterexamples.
While the literature on rent-seeking contests traditionally focuses on continuous costly tickets, the discrete
variant is very natural and more closely models the version of the auction held in practice.
1 Introduction
Chinese auctions are a combination between a raffle and an auction and are held in practice at charity events
or festivals [26]. In a Chinese auction, multiple players compete for several items by buying tickets, which
can be used to win the items. In front of each item there is a basket, and the players can bid by placing tickets
in the basket(s) corresponding to the item(s) they are trying to win. After all the players have placed their
tickets, a ticket is drawn at random from each basket and the item is given to the owner of the winning ticket.
While a player is never guaranteed to win an item, they can improve their chances of getting it by increasing
the number of tickets for that item.
Chinese auctions are related to the rent seeking contest introduced by Tullock in 1980 [25]. In the Tullock
contest, two players compete for winning a prize. The probability that a player wins the prize is a function of
both players’ effort. A player is never guaranteed to receive the item, but can increase his chances of winning
it by increasing his effort. There exist two main types of rent seeking contests, namely perfectly discrimi-
nating and imperfectly discriminating. In a perfectly discriminating contest, having the highest amount of
effort secures a win. Perfectly discriminating contests are a generalization of all-pay auctions and have been
studied, for example, in Moldovanu and Sela [14]. The authors analyze the optimal allocation of multiple
prizes with symmetric players and prove the existence of symmetric bidding equilibria for contestants with
linear, convex, and concave cost functions. In an imperfectly discriminating contest a player is never guaran-
teed to get an item, unless he is the only one exerting effort to obtain it. Both Chinese auctions and Tullock’s
original model are imperfectly discriminating contests. However, Chinese auctions are a generalization of
the Tullock contest when the exponent is R = 1 and multiple players compete for multiple prizes, where the
players have asymmetric valuations. We study auctions with both costly and given budgets - the latter variant
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is traditionally not analyzed in the rent seeking literature, but is a natural model related to several classes of
games such as threshold task games [4] or coalitional skill games [3]. In addition, the items that no player
placed a bid on are kept by an auctioneer, while in rent seeking literature it is commonly assumed that such
items are assigned to some player at random.
Gradstein and Nitzan [10] study a generalization of the rent seeking contest where the players are identical
and the number of items is restricted in a certain range, characterize the pure Nash equilibria of the game, and
give conditions for the existence of mixed Nash equilibria when n is large. Nitzan [17] surveys rent seeking
contests and describes settings where multiple players compete for rent under different assumptions regarding
the number of players, their risk attitudes, the source and nature of the rent. Chowdhury and Sheremeta
[5] study another generalization of the Tullock contest, in which two players compete for two prizes. The
probabilities of winning are defined as in the Tullock model, but the payoff of each player (contingent upon
winning or losing) is a linear function of the prizes, own effort, and effort of the rival. Nti [18] studies the
Tullock contest with asymmetric valuations of the two players for the prize and variable ranges of the return to
scale parameter, and establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure Nash
equilibrium. Hillman and Riley [11] study a lottery model with multiple players and one prize and prove the
existence of an equilibrium for both discriminating and indiscriminating contests, symmetric and asymmetric
valuations. Fang [8] shows that the equilibrium identified by Hillman and Riley is in fact unique. Siegel
[23] studies perfectly discriminating contests with multiple players and multiple identical prizes, provides a
closed form solution for the equilibrium payoffs, and analyzes player participation.
The model closest to ours in a published paper is by Palma and Munshi [7], where multiple players com-
pete for multiple prizes in an imperfectly discriminating contest. The paper focuses on defining a ’holistic’
probability model, in which the effort of the players are mapped to the aggregate probability of a possible out-
come. From the model, they derive the probability of a player being successful, and show that when the costs
of effort are symmetric among players, then a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists. Matros [13] considers the
exact same model of Chinese auctions as us and states the existence of a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium
when the valuations are symmetric and the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium with asymmetric valuations,
for both costly and given tickets. However, we are not aware of the existence of any full paper with proofs
of the stated results. On the contrary to the abstract, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium may not exist for
asymmetric games when some valuations are zero. In that case we prove that the auctioneer can stabilize the
game by placing his own ticket in each basket. On the other hand, when all the valuations are strictly posi-
tive, a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, and the equilibrium strategies are symmetric when both
valuations and budgets are symmetric. We also study Chinese auctions with discrete budgets, for which we
give both existence results and counterexamples. While the literature on rent-seeking contests traditionally
focuses on continuous costly tickets, the discrete variant is very natural and more closely models the version
of the auction held in practice.
2 The Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players and M = {1, . . . ,m} a set of prizes. Each player has several lottery
tickets which are chances to win the items. The players bid by placing tickets in a basket in front of each item
they are trying to win. After all the players distribute their tickets, a lottery is held at each item. One ticket is
drawn at random from the basket of the item, and the item is given to the owner of that ticket. The items that
no player placed a bid on are kept by the auctioneer.
Formally, for each player i, let wi be the total weight of i’s tickets. For each item j, let vi,j denote the
valuation of player i for item j. We study several types of budgets:
• Discrete budget: Each player has several indivisible tickets of weights Ti = {ti,1, . . . , ti,ni}, where∑ni
j=1 ti,j = wi. The player can distribute the tickets as he wishes across the bins.
• Continuous budget: Each player i has a budget wi. The player can distribute wi arbitrarily across the
items. If wi,j is the weight placed by player i on each item j, it must be the case that
∑m
j=1 wi,j = wi
2
and wi,j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈M .
We first study the setting where the players are endowed with the tickets and pay no cost for obtaining
them. However, the budget of each player i is limited and possibly different from that of the other players.
Definition 1. Given assignment x = (xi,j)i∈N,j∈M of tickets to items, where xi,j is the weight of the tickets
placed by player i on item j, the expected utility of player i is:
ui(x) =
m∑
j=1
σi,j(x)vi,j (1)
where
σi,j(x) =
{ xi,j∑
n
k=1
xk,j
if∑nk=1 xk,j > 0
0 otherwise
An assignment x of tickets to items is a pure Nash equilibrium if for every player i ∈ N and any other
assignment yi of tickets to items by player i, the following holds: ui(yi, x−i) ≤ ui(x).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we study the model introduced in Definition
1, for both continuous and discrete budgets. In the case of continuous budgets (Section 3.1), we show that a
pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist when all the valuations are strictly positive, and provide a closed
form solution of equilibrium strategies for symmetric valuations. When the valuations can be zero, then a
pure Nash equilibrium may not exist. In that case, the auctioneer can ensure existence by placing his own
ticket in each basket, such that no player gets the item if the auctioneer ticket is drawn. For discrete budgets
(Section 4, we give both existence results and counterexamples, depending on whether the players have more
than one ticket. Finally, in Section 4.1, we study costly continuous budgets. With costly tickets, a pure Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist when the valuations are strictly positive. When the valuations can be zero,
then an equilibrium may fail to exist, and similarly to the continuous given tickets scenario, the auctioneer
can help by placing his own ticket in each basket.
3 Given Tickets
In this section we study the game where the players are endowed with a budget of tickets, which they can use
to maximize their chances to win the items.
3.1 Continuous Budgets
We use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let f : Sm−1 → R, where Sm−1 = {y ∈ Rm|yi ≥ 0 and y1 + . . . + ym = W}. Define
f(y) =
∑m
j=1
bj
aj+yj
, where aj , bj > 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then f is strictly convex.
Theorem 1. Chinese auctions with symmetric valuations and continuous budgets have a pure Nash equilib-
rium in which all the players allocate the same percentage of their budget on a given item.
Proof. Since the valuations are symmetric, we can assume without loss of generality that all the values are
strictly positive. We show that the allocation in which every player i allocates amount xj =
(
vj
v1+...+vm
)
wi
on item j is a pure Nash equilibrium.
If all the other n− 1 players allocate xj (as defined above) on every sj , the utility of player i when using
allocation y = (y1, . . . , ym) is:
ui(y, x−i) =
m∑
j=1
yj · vj(∑
k 6=i
(W−wi)vj
v1+...+vm
)
+ yj
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where yj ≥ 0,
∑m
j=1 yj = wi, and W =
∑n
l=1 wl. We claim that when the other players allocate x−i, the
best response of player i is to allocate xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,m). Player i’s utility can be rewritten as:
ui(y, x−i) =
m∑
j=1
vj −
m∑
j=1
(
(W−wi)v
2
j
v1+...+vm
)
(
(W−wi)vj
v1+...+vm
)
+ yj
Let bi,j =
(W−wi)v
2
j
v1+...+vm
and ai,j = (W−wi)vjv1+...+vm , ∀j ∈ M . Define fi(y) : S
m−1
i → R, where S
m−1
i = {y ∈
R
m|yj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and y1+ . . .+ym = wi} by fi(y) =
∑m
j=1
bj
aj+yj
. An allocation y maximizes
player i’s utility if and only if fi has a global minimum at y. By Lemma 1, fi is strictly convex. Then fi has
a unique global minimum, and moreover any local minimum is also a global minimum.
Let gi,j(y) = −yj , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and hi(y) = y1 + . . .+ ym − wi. Finding the global minimum of
fi is equivalent to solving the following optimization problem:
min fi(y)
s.t. gi,j(y) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
hi(y) = 0
Since fi and gi,1, . . . , gi,m are continuously differentiable convex functions and hi is an affine function,
the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for a point y to be a global minimum of fi. Let
µi,j = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and λi = (W−wi)(v1+...+vm)W 2 . The KKT conditions at x are:
1. ∇fi(x) +
∑m
j=1 µi,j∇gi,j(x) + λ∇hi(x) = 0: That is,


−bi,1
(ai,1+xi,1)2
. . .
−bi,m
(ai,m+xi,m)2

 +

λi. . .
λi

 = 0, or λi =
bi,j
(ai,j+xi,j)2
, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, which is immediate from the definitions of ai,j , bi,j , and xi,j .
2. gi,j(x) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and hi(x) = 0: That is, xi,j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and xi,1 + . . . +
xi,m = wi, which follows from the definition of x.
3. µi,j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: By definition, µi,j = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
4. µi,jgi,j(x) = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: Immediate since µi,j = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Thus the best response of player i when all the other players allocate x−i is to also allocate according to x,
and so the game has a pure Nash equilibrium in which every player i allocates xi,j =
(
vj
v1+...+vm
)
wi on
every item j.
We obtain the following corollary when both the valuations and budgets are symmetric.
Corollary 1. Chinese auctions with symmetric valuations and symmetric continuous budgets have a sym-
metric pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that all the budgets are 1. By applying Theorem 1, we
obtain that the allocation xi,j = vjv1+...+vm for every player i and item j is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Chinese auctions with asymmetric valuations and asymmetric continuous budgets do not
necessarily have a pure Nash equilibrium when there exist zero valuations.
Proof. Consider a two player game with two items with the following valuations and budgets: v1,1 =
0, v1,2 = 1, v2,1 = 1, v2,2 = 3 and w1 = w2 = 1. Assume by contradiction that the game has a pure
Nash equilibrium, x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) ∈ [0, 1]. First note that x∗1 = 0, since otherwise player 1 can improve his
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utility by allocating more weight on item 2. For all ε > 0, x∗2 = 1 − ε cannot be a Nash equilibrium, since
u2(1, 1− ε) < u2(1, 1−
ε
2 ). Thus the only remaining candidate for an equilibrium is x
∗ = (1, 1). However,
there exists ε > 0 such that u2(1, 1− ε) > u2(1, 1). Thus the game has no pure Nash equilibrium.
When the players may have zero valuations, the auctioneer can guarantee the existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium by placing a small ticket in each basket, such that if the auctioneer ticket is drawn, no player gets
the item. To prove this, we use the following theorem [20].
Theorem 2. (Debreu 1952; Glicksberg 1952; Fan 1952) Consider a strategic form game whose strategy
spaces Si are nonempty compact convex subsets of an Euclidean space. If the payoff functions ui are contin-
uous in s and quasi-concave in si, then there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Chinese auctions with asymmetric valuations and asymmetric continuous budgets have a pure
Nash equilibrium when the auctioneer places a strictly positive ticket in each basket.
Proof. Let ∆j > 0 be the ticket placed by the auctioneer in each basket. Let xi,j be the weight placed by
player i on item j, where xi,j ≥ 0 and
∑m
j=1 xi,j = wi for all i ∈ N . The utility of player i is:
ui(x) =
m∑
j=1
(
xi,j
∆j +X
−i
j + xi,j
)
vi,j (2)
where X−ij =
∑
k 6=i xk,j is the weight placed by all players except i on item j. It can be easily verified
that the utility function of each player i, ui(x), is strictly concave in their own strategy, xi. The strategy
spaces Si = {y ∈ Rm|yj ≥ 0, y1 + . . . + ym = wi} are nonempty, compact, and convex. Moreover, ui(x)
is continuous in x since the denominator of each term in the sum of Equation (2) is strictly positive. Thus
the conditions of Theorem 2 apply, and the game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when the auctioneer
places a ticket in each basket.
When all the valuations are strictly positive, a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist. To prove this,
we use the following result by Reny [20] for discontinuous games. First, we define the better-reply secure
property of a game.
Definition 2. Player i can secure a payoff of α ∈ R at s ∈ S if there exists s¯i ∈ Si, such that ui(s¯i, s′−i) ≥ α
for all s′−i close enough to s−i.
Definition 3. A game G = (Si, ui)ni=1 is better-reply secure if whenever (s∗, u∗) is in the closure of the
graph of its vector payoff function and s∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, then some player i can secure a payoff
strictly above u∗i at s∗.
Theorem 4 (Reny, 1999). If each Si is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of a metric space, and each
ui(s1, . . . , sn) is quasi-concave in si, then the game G = (Si, ui)ni=1 has at least one pure Nash equilibrium
if in addition G is better-reply secure.
We now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5. Chinese auctions with asymmetric, strictly positive valuations and asymmetric continuous bud-
gets have a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The strategy spaces Si = {y ∈ Rm|yj ≥ 0, y1 + . . . + ym = wi} are nonempty, compact, and
convex. Again, the utility function of each player i is strictly concave in xi (and thus it is also quasi-concave).
We show that the game is also better-reply secure. By Reny [20], all games with continuous payoffs are
better-reply secure, and it is sufficient to check the property at the points where the utility functions are
discontinuous. In this case, the discontinuities occur when there exists an item j such that all the players
allocate zero towards that item. That is, the utility functions are discontinuous at the points in the set
D = {x ∈ S|∃j ∈M such that xi,j = 0, ∀i ∈ N}
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Let (x∗, u∗) be in the closure of the graph of the vector payoff function, where x∗ ∈ D. Then u∗ =
limK→∞(u1(x
K), . . ., un(x
K)) for some xK → x∗. Let J be the set of items on which no player allocates
any weight in x∗:
J = {j ∈M |x∗i,j = 0, ∀i ∈ N}
Then there exists a player i, an item l and N0 ∈ N such that
xKi,l
XK
l
≤ 1
n
+ 1
n2
, for all K ≥ N0. That is,
player i gets item l with probability less than 1
n
+ 1
n2
for all large enough K .
For every item k 6∈ J , we have: limK→∞
xKi,k
XK
k
=
x∗i,k
X∗
k
. Then u∗i can be rewritten as:
u∗i =

∑
j∈J
lim
K→∞
(
xKi,j
XKj
)
vi,j

+

∑
j 6∈J
(
x∗i,j
X∗j
)
vi,j


Let δ > 0 be small enough, and denote by Li the set of items on which player i allocates strictly positive
weight. That is, Li = {j ∈M |x∗i,j > 0}. Consider a new strategy profile, x
′
i, for player i, such that
x
′
i,j =


δ
|J| if j ∈ J
x∗i,j −
δ
|Li|
if j ∈ Li
x∗i,j(= 0) otherwise
The utility of i when playing x′i is:
ui(x
′
i, x
∗
−i) =

∑
j∈J
vi,j

+

∑
j∈Li
(
x∗i,j −
δ
|Li|
X∗j −
δ
|Li|
)
vi,j


Let δ > 0 be such that δ < min
(
x∗i,j |j ∈ Li
)
and δ < (1−
1
n
− 1
n2
)·|Li|·vi,l(∑
j∈Li
vi,j
X∗
j
)
. We have:
ui(x
′
i, x
∗
−i)− u
∗
i ≥
(
1−
1
n
−
1
n2
)
vi,l −
(
δ
|Li|
)∑
j∈Li
vi,j
X∗j

 > 0,
and so ui(x
′
i, x
∗
−i) > u
∗
i . The utility functions are continuous at x
′
= (x
′
i, x
∗
−i), and so there exists ε > 0
such that ui(x
′
i, y−i) > u
∗
i for all y−i ∈ B(x∗−i; ε). This completes the proof that the game is better-reply
secure. Thus the conditions of Theorem 4 are met and the game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
We note that the same result holds (with a very similar proof) when the items that no player placed a bid
on are given uniformly at random to a player, rather than being kept by the auctioneer.
3.2 Discrete Budgets
In this section we study the game where the budgets are discrete – in this case, each player has a number
of indivisible tickets. We refer to the subcase in which each player has exactly one ticket as a game with
indivisible budgets.
Theorem 6. Chinese auctions with symmetric players and indivisible budgets have a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following assignment of players to items:
• For each player k ∈ N in decreasing order of ticket weight:
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– Assign the ticket of player k to the item j such that
(
wk
Xj+wk
)
vj is maximal, where Xj is the
weight of the existing tickets at item j.
– Xj ← Xj + wk
Assume by contradiction that the assignment is not stable. Then there exists a player k who can deviate, by
moving his ticket from bin si to bin sj , for some i, j. For the deviation to be an improvement, it must be the
case that: (
wk
Xj + wk
)
vj >
(
wk
Xi
)
vi (3)
Consider the last player, l, who placed a ticket in bin si. At the time player l placed his ticket, it must have
been the case that bin si was preferable to bin sj , i.e.(
wl
Xi
)
vi >
(
wl
X
′
j + wl
)
vj (4)
where X ′j was the weight of bin sj when player l placed his ticket. Since Xj is the final weight at item j,
we have that Xj ≥ X
′
j . Finally, since the players are assigned in decreasing order of weights, we have that
wk ≥ wl, which combined with equations 3 and 4 give:(
vj
vi
)
Xi −Xj > wk ≥ wl ≥
(
vj
vi
)
Xi −Xj
This is a contradiction, thus the assumption must have been false, and the assignment is stable.
Proposition 2. Chinese auctions with symmetric valuations and asymmetric discrete budgets do not neces-
sarily have a pure Nash equilibrium, even in the case of two items.
Proof. Consider two players, with budgets w1 = 3 and w2 = 1, respectively, where all the coins have size 1,
and two items, such that v1 = v2 = v. Consider for example the assignment in which player 1 assigns two
tickets to item 1 and one ticket to item 2, while player 2 assigns one ticket to item 2. The expected value of
player 2 is u2 = v3 . Player 2 can deviate by placing his ticket on item 2 instead, which would give him higher
expected utility: u′2 = v2 > u2. The other assignments can be similarly verified.
Proposition 3. Chinese auctions with two items, asymmetric valuations, and asymmetric indivisible budgets
have a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following assignment:
• Assign all the players to item 1.
– Iteratively, take the player i with the lowest value ofwi
(
vi,1
vi,2
)
among the players bidding on item
1. Move player i’s ticket to item 2 if the move improves i’s utility.
The resulting assignment is an equilibrium. None of the players at item 1 have an incentive to move to 2,
since the player i who likes 1 the least (with the lowest ratio wi
(
vi,1
vi,2
)
among the players at 1) did not switch.
In addition, none of the players at item 2 have an incentive to switch back to item 1, since the last player j
who arrived at 2 does not want to switch, and all the previous players at 2 like this item at least as much as
player j.
Theorem 7. Chinese auctions with asymmetric valuations and symmetric indivisible budgets have a pure
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It can be verified that the allocation given by Algorithm 1 is a pure Nash equilibrium. Note that at
each step during the algorithm, only one player can deviate (at the active item). Moreover, each player can
deviate at most once in each iteration, since the current bin never degrades during the current iteration and
the other bins do not improve.
7
Algorithm 1: Equilibrium for Asymmetric Valuations and Symmetric Indivisible Budgets
1 foreach j ∈ [m] do
2 nj ← 0
3 foreach player i ∈ N do
4 Assign i to the item j which maximizes vi,j
nj+1
5 nj ← nj + 1
6 a← j // active item
7 while ∃ player l which can deviate from a do
8 Move l to the item k which maximizes vl,k
nk+1
9 na ← na − 1
10 nk ← nk + 1
11 a← k
4 Costly Tickets
In this section we analyze the game when the tickets are costly. The costly tickets scenario results in a model
similar to the Tullock contest and other rent-seeking problems. When each player i allocates weight xi,j ≥ 0
on item j, the utility of player i is:
ui(x) =
m∑
j=1
(σi,j(x)vi,j − xi,j) (5)
When the budgets are discrete, the definition is equivalent to:
ui(x) =
m∑
j=1
(σi,j(x)vi,j)− wi
4.1 Continuous Budgets
In this section we analyze the game when the budgets are continuous and the tickets are costly. First, note
that the expected value of player i from an item j is at most vj . Thus in any pure Nash equilibrium, it should
be the case that xi,j ≤ vi,j . Thus it is sufficient to study the game when the strategy spaces are restricted to
Sm−1i = {y ∈ R
m|0 ≤ yj ≤ vi,j , ∀j ∈M}, for every player i ∈ N .
We have the following results for continuous budgets.
Theorem 8. Chinese auctions with symmetric valuations and costly continuous budgets have a symmetric
pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We show that the allocation xi,j =
(
n−1
n2
)
vj , ∀i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is a pure Nash equilibrium.
For each i ∈ N , the utility of player i when the other players allocate x is:
ui(y, x−i) =
m∑
j=1

 yj · vj(∑
k 6=i
(
n−1
n2
)
vj
)
+ yj
− yj


=

 m∑
j=1
yj · vj(
n−1
n
)2
vj + yj
− yj


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Player i’s utility can be rewritten as:
ui(y, x−i) =

 m∑
j=1
vj

−

 m∑
j=1
bj
aj + yj
+ yj


where aj =
(
n−1
n
)2
vj and bj =
(
n−1
n
)2
v2j , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Let f : Sm−1i → R, f(y) =
∑m
j=1
(
bj
aj+yj
+ yj
)
. Similarly to Theorem 1, f is strictly convex and y
maximizes ui(y, x−i) if and only if y is a local minimum of f . It can be verified that yj =
(
n−1
n2
)
vj is a
local minimum of f , and so the best response of player i when the other players allocate x−i is to allocate
xi. Thus the game has a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium where each player i allocates xi,j =
(
n−1
n2
)
vj on
item j.
Similarly to the given budgets analysis, the game is not guaranteed to have a pure Nash equilibrium when
the valuations can be zero, but the auctioneer can guarantee the existence of an equilibrium by placing his
own ticket in each basket.
Proposition 4. Chinese auctions with asymmetric valuations and costly continuous budgets do not necessar-
ily have a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider two players with valuations v1,1 = 1, v1,2 = 0 and v2,1 = 1, v2,2 = 1. Assume by
contradiction that the game has a pure Nash equilibrium at (x1, x2). From Theorem 8, we have that 0 ≤
xi,j ≤ vi,j , ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}. If x2,2 > 0, then player 2 can improve his utility by deviating to x
′
2 = (x2,1,
x2,2
2 ).
If x2,2 = 0, then there exists ε > 0 such that by playing x
′′
2 = (x2,1, ε), player 2 gets u2(x1, x
′′
2 ) >
u2(x1, x2). Thus the game has no pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 9. Chinese auctions with asymmetric valuations and continuous costly budgets have a pure Nash
equilibrium when the auctioneer places a strictly positive ticket in each basket.
Proof. Let ∆j > 0 be the ticket placed by the auctioneer in each basket. For each strategy vector x, the
utility of player i is:
ui(x) =
m∑
j=1
((
xi,j
∆j +Xj
)
vi,j − xi,j
)
(6)
where Xj =
∑
k∈N xk,j is the weight placed by all players on item j. The utility function of player i, ui(x)
is quasi-concave in xi. The strategy spaces Si = {y ∈ Rm|0 ≤ yj ≤ vi,j , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} are nonempty,
compact, and convex. Moreover, ui(x) is continuous in x since the denominator of each term in the sum of
Equation (6) is strictly positive. Thus the conditions of Theorem 2 apply, and the game has a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium when the auctioneer places a ticket in each basket.
Finally, when the valuations are strictly positive, a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist.
Theorem 10. Chinese auctions with asymmetric, strictly positive valuations and costly continuous budgets
have a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5. The strategy spaces Si are non-empty, compact, and convex.
The utility function of each player i is quasi-concave in xi. The discontinuities occur at the points in the set
D = {x ∈ S|∃j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that xi,j = 0, ∀i ∈ N}
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 5. That is, it can be verified that for any (x∗, u∗) in the closure
of the graph of the vector payoff function, where x∗ ∈ D, there exists a player i and a strategy x′i such that
ui(x
′
i, y−i) > u
∗
i for all y−i ∈ B(x∗−i; ε). The conditions of Theorem 4 are met and the game has a pure
Nash equilibrium.
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A Appendix
Lemma 1. Let f : Sm−1 → R, where Sm−1 = {y ∈ Rm|yi ≥ 0 and y1 + . . . + ym = W}. Define
f(y) =
∑m
j=1
bj
aj+yj
, where aj , bj > 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then f is strictly convex.
Proof. The domain of f is convex, thus it is sufficient to verify that for all y 6= z ∈ Sm−1 and λ ∈ (0, 1),
f(λy + (1 − λ)z) < λf(y) + (1 − λ)f(z). For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let fj : R+ ← R, fj(x) = bjaj+yj .
Then f ′′j =
2bj
(aj+yj)3
> 0, and fj is strictly convex. Thus aj ·bjaj+λyj+(1−λ)zj ≤ λ
(
aj ·bj
aj+yj
)
+ (1− λ)
(
aj ·bj
aj+zj
)
(∗) with equality if and only if yj = zj . By summing (∗) over all j and noting that at least one inequality is
strict (since y 6= z), we obtain that f is strictly convex.
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